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Impeachment in a System of Checks and
Balances
Keith E. Whittington*

ABSTRACT
Measured by any yardstick, it is hard to think that the first impeachment
of President Donald Trump was particularly successful. But there are
important broader questions raised particularly by the first Trump
impeachment that have significance for how we think about the impeachment
power moving forward. If future impeachment efforts are to be more
successful, or even useful, Congress will have to understand the nature of the
constitutional task that it is undertaking.
As the House contemplates making use of the impeachment power and
the Senate contemplates whether to convict an officer in an impeachment
trial, there are some basic questions that must be asked in any impeachment
episode. What is an impeachable offense? Is this kind of behavior
impeachable? Does this instance of misconduct justify impeachment? It
should not have been hard for the House to answer the first two questions in
regard to the first Trump impeachment. The third question was the more
challenging to answer, and the House struggled to answer it.
This Article argues that abusing the powers of the presidency for the
sake of purely personal interests is well within the traditional scope of the
impeachment power. In order to assess whether an officer has abused power
in that way, members of Congress must take care to deliberate across the
political aisle so as to identify and resolve possible good-faith explanations
for an officer’s behavior. A House that does not bother to curb its own
partisan instincts risks abusing its own constitutional authority by rushing
headlong into an impeachment that does not meet the constitutional standard
of high crimes and misdemeanors. Even after the House and the Senate have
come to an understanding of the scope of impeachable offenses and each has
satisfied itself that an officer has committed deeds that fall within that scope,
they must still decide whether an impeachment and a conviction and removal
is warranted. Those decisions are necessarily political judgments about
what risks the country faces and how they are best navigated. If Congress is
to contemplate pursuing an impeachment, it should have a clear view of what
it is trying to accomplish and why impeachment is the best path to getting
there.
*

William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics at Princeton University; Visiting
Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few principles were so central to the founding era thinking about
constitutional design as that power ought to be made to check power.1 The
records of the Philadelphia Convention are replete with discussions of how
adequate checks on power are to be established. Edmund Randolph
thought the Confederation period had demonstrated the “turbulence and
follies of democracy” and “that some check therefore was to be sought for
against this tendency of our Governments,” and hoped the Senate would
do the trick.2 Elbridge Gerry thought the judiciary ought to “have a
sufficient check against encroachments on their own department,” and
thought its authority of deciding on the constitutionality of the laws would
provide it.3 Benjamin Franklin worried that an absolute presidential veto
over laws would be “a mischievous sort of check,”4 but James Wilson
worried that if the legislative could override a presidential veto too easily,
the “Executive check” might prove inadequate, in “tempestuous
moments,” to allow the executive “to defend itself.”5 Hugh Williamson
thought a legislature divided into two chambers could “serve as a mutual
check,”6 and James Madison hoped to provide Congress with a “check”
1

GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION

OF THE

AMERICAN REPUBLIC 547–53

(1969).
2
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 42 (Koch
ed. 1987). Edmund Randolph was the senior-most constitutional delegate from
Virginia, a former governor and attorney general of Virginia, and the introducer of the
Virginia Plan to the convention. See Kevin R.C. Gutzman, Edmund Randolph and
Virginia Constitutionalism, 66(3) REVIEW OF POLITICS 469 (2004).
3
MADISON, supra note 2, at 61. Elbridge Gerry was a Massachusetts merchant,
a critical player in keeping American forces supplied during the Revolution, and an
active participant in the convention debates though he refused to sign the final
document. Nicholas Mosvick, Forgotten Founders: Elbridge Gerry, The “Brusque
Maverick”, NAT’L CONSTITUTION CNTR (Aug. 3, 2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/
blog/forgotten-founders-elbridge-gerry-the-brusque-maverick
[https://perma.cc/F4D7-5NUM].
4
MADISON, supra note 2, at 62. Benjamin Franklin was the senior statesman of
the convention, a drafter of the Declaration of Independence, a longtime American
diplomat to England and France, and president of Pennsylvania at the time of the
convention. See Mary Bellis, Biography of Benjamin Franklin, Printer, Inventor,
Statesman, THOUGHT CO. (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/story-ofbenjamin-franklin-1989852 [https://perma.cc/6L8X-JRPR].
5
MADISON, supra note 2, at 63. James Wilson was a prominent Philadelphia
lawyer, leading Federalist in Pennsylvania, and future justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court. See William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10(5)
J. CONSTITUTIONAL L. 901 (2008).
6
MADISON, supra note 2, at 82. Hugh Williamson was a leader of the North
Carolinian delegation at the convention. See Louis W. Potts, Hugh Williamson: The
Poor Man’s Franklin and the National Domain, 64(4) N.C. HISTORICAL REV. 371
(1987).
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against the “mischiefs” of the states.7 Checks had to be put in place
everywhere so that no actor or interest could become too powerful or
abusive.
The ultimate and most powerful of these checks, the impeachment
power, was entrusted to the Congress. With this power, the legislative
branch was vested with the sole authority to remove, when necessary,
members of the other branches of the federal government. Members of
the legislature could themselves only be removed by the chamber as a
whole – through expulsion – or by their constituents as regular intervals—
through election. The other branches of government were designed to be
powerful and independent, but the legislature held the trump card. Though
Madison was among those who worried about “a powerful tendency in the
Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex,” there was no other body
that could be entrusted to exercise a power to impeach and remove
misbehaving members of the judicial and executive branches.8
The impeachment power might be a powerful congressional weapon,
but it seemed more like a paper tiger during the presidency of Donald
Trump. In late 2019, President Trump became only the third president in
American history to be formally impeached.9 Remarkably, in a single term
of office he was impeached not once, but twice. Trump’s impeachment
troubles will surely be the leading topic when recording his presidential
legacy.
It is hard, however, to consider either Trump impeachment
particularly successful. If the goal was to remove Trump from the White
House, then impeachment never truly stood a chance, as the President
never faced any serious risk of losing the Senate vote and being convicted.
If the goal was to chasten the President and induce him to change his
behavior while he occupied the Oval Office, the first impeachment seemed
to do the opposite. Republican Senator Susan Collins famously explained
her own vote for acquittal by saying, “I believe that the president has
learned from his case. The president has been impeached. That’s a pretty

7

MADISON, supra note 2, at 88. James Madison was a central force at the
convention, a principal author of the Constitution and later the Bill of Rights, and a
key strategist for constitutional ratification. Michael Gerhardt & Jeffrey Rosen,
Introduction: A Madisonian Constitution for All, NAT’L CONSTITUTION CNTR (2020),
https://constitutioncenter.org/debate/special-projects/a-madisonian-constitution-forall/essay-series/introduction-to-a-madisonian-constitution-for-all
[https://perma.cc/F4XM-GP5Y].
8
MADISON, supra note 2, at 338.
9
Richard Nixon having likely escaped that fate by resigning ahead of a House
impeachment vote. Valerie Strauss, History lesson: Richard Nixon was not
impeached,
WASH.
POST
(May
29,
2017,
11:55
a.m.
EST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/05/29/richard-nixonwas-not-impeached-despite-what-hillary-clinton-and-others-say/
[https://perma.cc/PKC4-4HJD].
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big lesson.”10 Instead, Trump seems to have learned a different lesson than
Collins would have hoped. He learned that he could count on his copartisans to stick by his side and defeat any effort to remove him from
office. Rather than adopting an apologetic attitude after his first
impeachment ordeal, he was defiant, with the White House declaring the
result to be a “full vindication and exoneration.”11 As Republicans rallied
around their embattled President, Democratic leadership made that easier
by leaning into the partisanship. Rather than trying to build a broad
coalition that might have emphasized that the concerns about the President
were not merely the sour grapes of the opposition party, the Democrats
chose to sideline the many conservative critics of Trump in preparing and
moving forward with their impeachment effort.12 Rather than authorizing
a single committee to open a formal impeachment inquiry and construct a
coherent public narrative to justify impeaching a sitting president, the
House stumbled through an ad hoc process with no clear direction and
unnecessarily opaque authority.13
There are important broader questions raised particularly by the first
Trump impeachment that have significance for how we think about the
impeachment power moving forward. The first Trump impeachment
generated significant debate over how to think about the scope of
impeachable offenses and the responsibilities of Congress when
confronted by the kind of presidential behavior displayed by Donald
Trump.
As the House contemplates making use of the impeachment power
and the Senate contemplates whether to convict an officer in an
impeachment trial, there are some basic questions that must be asked in
any impeachment episode. What is an impeachable offense? Is this kind
of behavior impeachable? Does this instance of misconduct justify
impeachment? In this Article, I examine each question. The goal is not
to relitigate the first Trump impeachment but to clarify how future

10
John Bowden, Collins: Trump Has Learned ‘A Pretty Big Lesson’ From
Impeachment,
THE
HILL
(Feb.
4,
2020,
5:35
p.m.
EST),
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/481486-collins-trump-has-learned-a-pretty-biglesson-from-impeachment/ [https://perma.cc/QYD3-73UP].
11
Statement from the White House Press Secretary, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 5,
2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-presssecretary-109/ [https://perma.cc/9N2K-9Z85].
12
See Keith E. Whittington, The House Impeachment: A Postmortem, LAWFARE
(Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/house-impeachment-postmortem
[https://perma.cc/4DQ7-FT7Z] (“An impeachment is not a failure just because it ends
in an acquittal, but an impeachment process that heightens political divisions without
reinforcing the proper limits on the conduct of government officials is not much of a
success.”).
13
Id.
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members of Congress should think about these questions when the
impeachment issue is once again raised.

II. WHAT IS AN IMPEACHABLE OFFENSE?
If the House wants to determine whether it should use the
impeachment power, it first must know when the impeachment power can
be used. Setting aside the jurisdictional question of who can be subjected
to a House impeachment and Senate trial,14 the Constitution lays down a
substantive standard for what constitutes an impeachable offense. Article
II specifies that officers can be impeached and removed for “Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”15 The offenses of
treason and bribery are relatively straightforward to define but have been
of limited significance for how the impeachment power has actually been
used over time. In practice, the most important set of impeachable
offenses has also been the least clear—those that fall within the scope of
“high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” The history and purpose of the
impeachment power demonstrate that the scope of impeachable offenses
is broad and flexible in allowing Congress to reach the unpredictable but
potentially serious threats to the constitutional order that can arise from
the misbehavior of federal officers.
The impeachment clause contained in the U.S. Constitution creates a
broad standard rather than a precise rule. As a consequence, there has been
persistent disagreement about what exactly the scope of the impeachment
power might be. Particularly, the constitutional specification that officers
can be impeached and removed for high crimes and misdemeanors has
encouraged ongoing debate about what falls within the range of
impeachable offenses.16 Despite the existence of that debate, the

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office . . . .”). Of course, the second
Trump impeachment raised particularly interesting questions of whether a former
president can be tried on impeachment charges in the Senate. I have argued that he
can. See Keith E. Whittington, Can a Former President Be Impeached and
Convicted?, LAWFARE (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-formerpresident-be-impeached-and-convicted [https://perma.cc/6RKV-ZSZE]; Keith E.
Whittington, Can the House Impeach a Former President?, REASON (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://reason.com/volokh/2019/12/05/can-the-house-impeach-a-former-president
[https://perma.cc/3MT7-AVCV]; see also Brian C. Kalt, The Constitutional Case for
the Impeachability of Former Federal Officials: An Analysis of the Law, History, and
Practice of Late Impeachment, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 13 (2001).
15
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
16
The practice of federal impeachments has mostly operated within the
“construction zone” of constitutional indeterminacy. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999) (examination of historical impeachments as
constitutional constructions); Lawrence B. Solum, Interpretation/Construction
14
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mainstream political and scholarly view has been that the impeachment
power is broad and that impeachable offenses include abuses of power.17
Given the nature of the charges against President Trump, it is not
surprising that his defenders tried to narrow the scope of impeachable
offenses to exclude political misdeeds and include only ordinary criminal
offenses. The first step of setting up a defense to an impeachment is to
question whether the acts being charged are even impeachable offenses
within the scope of the House’s impeachment power. Given the language
of the constitutional provision, reducing “high Crimes” to the most
familiar kind of “crime” – ordinary indictable criminal offenses – is a
natural move to make. It is a move that the House should, and traditionally
has, rejected.18
It is tempting, especially for those charged with an impeachable
offense, to attempt to analogize high crimes to ordinary crimes. The
Constitution lists two familiar sorts of criminal acts as impeachable,19 and
the language of crimes, misdemeanors, trials, and convictions that
permeates the impeachment process is resonant of the ordinary criminal
justice system. Ordinary criminal offenses have the advantage of being
well known, and thus provide both clear notice to officers that they should
avoid committing such offenses and reduce the need for legislators to have
to grapple with a broader but less conventional category of impeachable
offenses. Legislators who prefer to outsource impeachment investigations
to special counsels benefit from a list of impeachable offenses that is
coterminous with the criminal code.
Even well before the House voted on articles of impeachment,
Trump’s defenders had been actively arguing that he could not be
impeached for anything other than the commission of ordinary criminal
offenses. Alan Dershowitz has been the most prominent advocate of this
view of late, though it is not completely without precedent.20 As
impeachment threats swirled around the Trump presidency, Dershowitz
argued that Congress should understand the impeachment power as
limited to statutory crimes comparable to the named offenses of treason
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 27 CONST. CMT. 108 (2010) (defining construction
zone as a “zone of underdeterminacy” in constitutional meaning).
17
See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, “High Crimes” After Clinton: Deciding
What’s Impeachable, 99 Pol’y. Rev. 27 (2000); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT,
IMPEACHMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 59–65 (2018); FRANK O. BOWMAN
III, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 244–52 (2019).
18
See Keith E. Whittington, A Formidable Weapon of Faction? The Law and
Politics of Impeachment, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 381, 403−04 (2020).
19
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
20
See generally, Niko Bowie, High Crimes Without Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. F.
39 (2018); WHITTINGTON, supra note 16, at 28−30, 145−48.
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and bribery.21 As the House impeachment inquiry advanced, Dershowitz
dismissed the House’s efforts: “You can't just make it up. To have a crime,
you have to find something in the statute book that existed before the
actions took place, and that was clear and unequivocal. It's just not
there.”22 Similarly, Trump’s former attorney general Matthew Whittaker
took to the airwaves to ask, “What evidence of a crime do you have? . . .
Abuse of power is not a crime.”23 Former Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr explained in interviews, “That is not a crime. It is poor judgment by
the president.”24 These arguments made their way into the President’s
formal response to the articles of impeachment. This response was
particularly impassioned, contending that “the Articles of Impeachment
are constitutionally invalid on their face. They fail to allege any crime or
violation of law whatsoever, let alone ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors,’
as required by the Constitution.”25 The President’s trial memorandum was
only slightly more staid, arguing that the
House Democrats’ novel theory of ‘abuse of power’ improperly
supplants the standard of ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors’ with a
made-up theory. . . . By limiting impeachment to cases of ‘Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,’ the Framers
restricted impeachment to specific offenses against ‘already known
and established law.’26

Anything else, Trump’s defenders argued, would open the door to
politicized impeachments and threaten to make government officers more
dependent on the good will of Congress in order to retain their offices.27
It might follow that one way to maintain the independence of the executive

21

ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE AGAINST IMPEACHING TRUMP (2018).
Alan Dershowitz: It’s “Unconstitutional” to Impeach Trump, Media Matters,
MEDIA MATTERS (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.mediamatters.org/trumpimpeachment-inquiry/alan-dershowitz-its-unconstitutional-impeach-trump
[https://perma.cc/8QG6-5DQX].
23
Jonathan Chait, “Abuse of Power is Not a Crime”: Trump’s Former Attorney
General Defines His Credo, THE INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/10/abuse-of-power-is-not-a-crime-matthewwhitaker-trump-impeachment.html [https://perma.cc/7X36-DUW5].
24
Mike Brest, Ken Starr Says Trump Showed “Poor Judgment” But “That’s Not
a
Crime”,
WASHINGTON
EXAMINER
(Sep.
29,
2019),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tag/donald-trump?source=%2Fnews%2Fkenstarr-predicts-trump-impeachment-inquiry-is-doomed-to-fail
[https://perma.cc/FV4P-VYQ7].
25
JAY ALAN SEKULOW & PAT A. CIPOLLONE, ANSWER OF PRESIDENT DONALD J.
TRUMP 1 (2020).
26
JAY ALAN SEKULOW & PAT A. CIPOLLONE, TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP 24 (2020).
27
See, e.g., id.
22
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and judicial branches from the legislative is to sharply limit the
circumstances in which Congress could legitimately attempt to remove
individuals holding office in the other two branches of government. This
narrow understanding of impeachable offenses is at odds with most
scholarship on the meaning of this constitutional provision and with the
historical practice making use of the impeachment provision, but it
buttresses the fortifications of the other two branches against an ambitious
Congress.28
Examining the relevant history, however, makes clear that this
understanding of impeachment is unnecessarily constrained. The
constitutional framers were familiar with the impeachment device from
English history, and after independence, it was quickly incorporated into
American state constitutions.
In English parliamentary practice,
impeachment was a tool for checking the king and his ministers, and the
term “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” developed within that practice to
refer to misconduct by public officers. William Blackstone noted that
“oppression and tyrannical partiality . . . in the administration and under
the colour of their office” could often escape ordinary justice and was
therefore accountable “by impeachment in parliament.”29 Famously, more
than a century before the American Revolution, the House of Commons
had impeached the Earl of Strafford for attempting “to subvert the
Fundamental Laws and Government of the Realms . . . and instead thereof,
to introduce Arbitrary and Tyrannical Government.”30 The British
imperial officer Warren Hastings was embroiled in an impeachment
scandal at the time of the Philadelphia Convention, and the House of
Commons eventually charged him with “arbitrary, illegal, unjust, and
tyrannical Acts” that rendered him “guilty of High Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”31
The early state constitutions included their own impeachment
provisions based on the English practice. For example, the Delaware
constitution of 1776 empowered the assembly to impeach those
“offending against the State, either by maladministration, corruption, or
other means, by which the safety of the Commonwealth may be
endangered.”32 The New York constitution vested in the “representatives
of the people in assembly” the “power of impeaching all officers of the

28
29

See Whittington, supra note 18, at 404.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 140−41

(1776).
30
The Trial of the Earl of Strafford, on an Impeachment of High Treason, 1
STATE TRIALS 100 (Samuel March Phillips ed. 1826).
31
1 MINUTES OF THE EVIDENCE TAKEN AT THE TRIAL OF WARREN HASTINGS
ESQUIRE 7 (1788).
32
DE. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIII.
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State, for mal and corrupt conduct in their respective offices.”33 The
Massachusetts constitution of 1780 established an impeachment process
for officers charged with “misconduct and maladministration in their
offices.”34 Likewise, the officers of Virginia were impeachable for
“offending against the State, either by maladministration, corruption, or
other means, by which the safety of the State may be endangered.”35
As the framers in Philadelphia contemplated creating a powerful and
independent chief executive subject only to quadrennial elections, they
agreed overwhelmingly that some ability to truncate the term of office of
a misbehaving president would be necessary. James Madison thought it
was “indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the
Community against the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief
Magistrate.”36 In the months after his inauguration, the president might
“lose his capacity,” or “pervert his administration into a scheme of
peculation or oppression,” or “betray his trust to foreign powers.”37
Madison and others were also concerned that the president not become as
subservient to the legislature as the early state governors often were.
Making impeachment and removal too easy might subvert the
independence of the executive that the Federalists also wanted to establish.
The Convention thus rejected George Mason’s suggestion of using the
common state language of “maladministration,” and instead favored the
language of “high crimes and misdemeanors.”38 “High crimes” seemed to
capture the range of potential dangers that concerned Madison and others,
without leaving the president vulnerable to impeachment over routine
political and policy disagreements.
Subsequent commentators understood what the constitutional
framers had done, and why they had done it. In Federalist No. 65,
Alexander Hamilton noted that even an elected government would need
an impeachment power to address “those offenses which proceed from the
misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation
of some public trust.”39 They were political offenses, which “relate chiefly
to injuries done immediately to society itself.”40 Charles Pinckney argued
in the South Carolina ratification convention that “abuse of power was
more effectually checked” under the proposed Constitution than under the
Articles of Confederation, and the primary evidence he offered was the
existence of an impeachment power by which “those who behave amiss,
33

N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIII.
MASS. CONST. ch. I, § 2, art. VIII.
35
VA. CONST. of 1776.
36
MADISON , supra note 2, at 332.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 605.
39
THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
40
Id.
34
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or betray their public trust” could be called to account by elected
representatives of the people.41
In response to anti-Federalists worried that the Constitution invested
too much power in federal officials, Federalists like South Carolina’s
Edward Rutledge responded that the “very idea of power included the
possibility of doing harm” and to “argue against the use of a thing from
the abuse of it, had long since been exploded by all sensible people.”42
Federalists argued that it was better to adequately empower federal
officers to do good and then take care that if they “abused their trust, they
were liable to impeachment and punishment.”43 In North Carolina,
Archibald Maclaine pointed out that it was “certainly necessary” that some
“mode of punishment” be established so that federal officers “should be
kept within proper bounds.”44 Future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell
observed that the impeachment power was “calculated to bring [“great
offenders”] to punishment for crime which it is not easy to describe, but
which every one must be convinced is a high crime and misdemeanor
against the government.”45 When there is a “great injury to the
community,” the elected representatives of the people are the ones best
positioned to assess its nature and cause and take action against the
offender, even when the offenses are of such a nature that they “cannot be
easily reached by an ordinary tribunal” or cannot “be punishable” by
ordinary law.46
The anti-Federalist Patrick Henry was less impressed by the security
offered by the impeachment power. Though critics of the Constitution
were assured that an officer who did “any thing derogatory to the honor or
interest of their country” could be impeached and removed, Henry pointed
out that those holding federal power would “try themselves” under the
impeachment clause.47 He thought there could be no “security where
offenders mutually try one another.”48 George Nicholas, by contrast,
expected the impeachment power, held in the hands of representatives who
were accountable “to the people at large,” to be an effective deterrent to
“mal-administration” or abuse of the pardoning power by the president.49
Edmund Randolph even suggested that the president could be impeached

41
JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 281 (1836).
42

Id. at 276.
Id.
44
Id. at 34.
45
Id. at 113.
46
Id. at 113–14.
47
ELLIOT, supra note 41.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 17.
43
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if he were “dishonest” in abusing the power to adjourn the two houses of
Congress or for accepting an emolument from a foreign power.50
Early commentators on the Constitution continued to emphasize this
broad scope of the federal impeachment power. The framers had indeed
drafted a limited power of impeachment, but that limitation did not narrow
the scope of impeachable offenses to ordinary crimes. Justice James
Wilson pointed out in his law lectures that the impeachment power in
America was “confined to political characters, to political crimes and
misdemeanors, and to political punishments,” unlike the practice in
England in which Parliament sometimes judged accusations of ordinary
crimes committed by “offenders who were thought to be out of the reach
of the ordinary power of the law.”51 St. George Tucker simply noted that
“all officers of the government, including the president, are impeachable
for misconduct in office.”52 In his overview of the Constitution, Justice
Joseph Story concluded that “crimes of a strictly legal character” did fall
within the impeachment power but that it would be “ordinarily applied” as
a remedy to offenses “of a political character” that grew out of “personal
misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the
public interests, in the discharge of the duties of political office.”53
William Rawle concluded that the impeachment power was carried over
into the United States because, though “the firmness and integrity of the
ordinary tribunals” would be adequate to hold to account any American –
no matter how exalted – only a court of impeachment could remove a
current officeholder and thereby prevent the “injury sustained by the
nation” from being “renewed or increased, if the executive authority were
perverse, tyrannical, or corrupt.”54 The “offenses which may be
committed equally by a private person as a public officer” were not
generally the proper subject of an impeachment but could instead be “left
to the ordinary course of judicial proceeding.”55 The impeachment power
was needed to check “men whose treachery to their country might be
productive of the most serious disasters.”56 With a century’s worth of
perspective, the great constitutional commentator of the late nineteenth
century Thomas Cooley concluded,

50

Id. at 368, 486.
JAMES WILSON, 2 THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D.
166 (1804).
52
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 178 (1803).
53
JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 532 (2d ed. 1851).
54
WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 207 (1825).
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It is often found that offences of a very serious nature by high officers
are not offences against the criminal code, but consist in abuses or
betrayals of trust, or inexcusable neglects of duty, which are dangerous
and criminal because of the immense interests involved and the
greatness of the trust which has not been kept. Such cases must be left
to be dealt with on their own facts, and judged according to their
apparent deserts.57

Across its history, the U.S. House of Representatives has approved only a
small number of impeachments, and yet it has not confined itself to cases
involving violations of the criminal code. The House’s own practice
manual concludes from the precedents that impeachable offenses consist
of “misconduct incompatible with the official position of the office
holder.”58 Its assessment of presidential impeachments concludes that
they have generally involved charges of “abusing or exceeding the law
powers of the office.”59 Many other impeachments involved nonfelonious behavior that was nonetheless judged to be “grossly
incompatible with the office,” ranging from officers “appearing on the
bench during the trial in a state of intoxication” or “permitting his partisan
views to influence his conduct in certain trials” to committing “sexual
misconduct with court employees” or preventing, obstructing or impeding
the administration of justice.60 “Less than one-third of all the articles the
House has adopted have explicitly charged the violation of a criminal
statute or used the word ‘criminal’ or ‘crime’ to describe the conduct
alleged.”61
The constitutional standard is not whether an officer has committed
an ordinary criminal offense. To support an impeachment, there does not
need to be a crime, only a high crime and misdemeanor. A president who
egregiously misuses the powers of his office or engages in conduct grossly
incompatible with the dignity of his office has forfeited the right to
continue to occupy his office and is subject to the constitutional judgment
of the Senate acting as a court of impeachment. The House and the Senate
might conclude that accusations of misconduct are ungrounded or that
remedy of removal is unwarranted, but the misconduct that they might
assess need not involve violations of the criminal law.
At the start of 2020, the Senate was asked to convict President Trump
on two articles of impeachment, neither of which charged him with having
committed ordinary indictable crimes. He was charged with abusing the
57
THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 159 (1880).
58

CHARLES W. JOHNSON, JOHN V. SULLIVAN, AND THOMAS J. WICKHAM, JR.,
HOUSE PRACTICE 592 (2017).
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powers of the presidency for the sake of his purely personal interests. A
senator might reasonably think that such acts did not really constitute
abuses of office, or that if they were abuses, they were not grave enough
to merit the immediate removal of a sitting president in an election year.
Senators might even conclude that President Trump had learned his lesson
and could be counted on to conduct himself in a more presidential manner
for the remainder of his tenure. Such judgments would be compatible with
acquitting President Trump, but they would also have preserved traditional
understandings of the scope of the impeachment power.

III. IS THIS KIND OF BEHAVIOR IMPEACHABLE?
Knowing that the standard of impeachable offenses is not limited to
ordinary crimes is only the first step, of course. The House must still
determine whether the particular acts that an officer has committed are
properly within the scope of that standard. While the constitutional
guidance is limited, this section provides more robust guidance. Members
of Congress should be self-conscious about their own limitations and the
temptation to assume the worst about political opponents. The
impeachment process encourages legislators to check their own judgments
by deliberating across the political aisle to try to get a broader perspective
on what might motivate an officer’s actions and how it might be perceived.
The corrupt motives and purposes of the President’s actions and the threats
he posed to the proper functioning of the democratic constitutional order
helped justify a congressional conclusion that his particular behavior fell
within the scope of the impeachment power.
It is widely accepted that the scope of impeachable offenses should
be construed so broadly as to encompass ordinary political and policy
disagreements.
The
constitutional
drafters’
rejection
of
“maladministration” in favor of “high crimes and misdemeanors” marked
an effort to tighten the standard for impeachable offenses from one that
was common in some of the early state constitutions and to ensure that the
president was more independent of the Congress than the governors
frequently were of the state legislatures.62 Maladministration could imply
errors in judgment. High crimes and misdemeanors implied misconduct.
Congress was not to remove a president simply because it disagreed with
his policies and how he administered the executive branch. Ordinary
political disagreements were to be resolved through more ordinary
political means. The heavy constitutional weaponry of the impeachment
power was to be reserved for more extraordinary occasions. Around the
time of the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, John Norton
Pomeroy argued that “very many breaches of public duty” were within the
62

See, e.g., MARC KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY 123–30 (1997)
(on the weakness of early state governors).
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scope of the impeachment power, but not “a mere mistake in the exercise
of [an officer’s] discretion.”63 As John Randolph Tucker observed at the
end of the nineteenth century, the “obvious purpose of the Constitution”
was to empower Congress “to deprive of office those who by any act of
omission or commission showed clear and flagrant disqualification to hold
it.”64 Failures of duty that were “due to mistake, inadvertence or
misjudgment” were to be addressed by other means, but “a purposed
defiance of official duty” or “flagrant misbehavior” were within the
purpose of this constitutional tool to deal with the dangers of a “wicked
executive.”65
It is a challenge for the House to distinguish between the “flagrant
misbehavior” of a “wicked executive” and an instance of a mere “mistake,
inadvertence or misjudgment.”66 Federal officers will not always make it
easy to know on which side of that line they are operating, and in a
polarized political environment, it is only natural to jump to conclusions.
One check on that tendency is to incorporate the target of the impeachment
inquiry into the process at an early stage so as to give the officer an
opportunity to craft a defense of his actions or explicitly forego the
opportunity to do so. If a president can provide an appropriate rationale
for his conduct and dispel the suspicion that he is simply a “wicked
executive,” then he may peel away votes in the House during the
impeachment inquiry and at least create reasonable doubt in the public and
in the legislature as to whether his actions merit immediately truncating
his term of office.
Advocates for impeachment can further substantiate their own
instincts by self-consciously reaching across the political aisle. The
supermajority requirement in the Senate provides an effective restraint on
what Thomas Jefferson worried would become “the most formidable
weapon for the purposes of a dominant faction that ever was contrived.”67
It has turned out to be very rare that a single party controls enough seats
in the Senate to be able to convict and remove officers on a pure party-line
vote. A partisan House majority might be able to impeach an officer, but
if it wants to remove an officer it will need to win over some votes from
the other party. That process of stress-testing the case of impeachment
should begin early. If impeachment advocates are only appealing to their
partisan base, they will not only fail to mount a credible prosecution that
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has a chance of reaching the two-thirds threshold in the Senate, but they
will also too easily delude themselves into believing that ordinary policy
disagreements are something more nefarious. A House that does not
bother to curb its own partisan instincts risks abusing its own constitutional
authority by rushing headlong into an impeachment that does not meet the
constitutional standard of high crimes and misdemeanors.
A classic basis for distinguishing “maladministration” from
“misconduct” is to focus on the motives of the officer. Early state
constitutions frequently listed “corruption” as an instance of an
impeachable offense.68 The federal Constitution did not repeat that
language, but the discussions surrounding the adoption of the Constitution
made it plain that such considerations were still part of the founding-era
thinking about the purpose of the impeachment power. Subsequent usage
has frequently targeted corrupt behavior by federal officers, clarifying
through the course of legislative precedent that corrupt acts are within the
scope of the impeachment power. Determining whether any particular
action of an officer is properly, or best, attributed to corrupt motives may
require difficult judgments, but an important line of inquiry in attempting
to ascertain whether an action is best characterized as misconduct is
exploring the explanations for the action and evaluating the credibility of
the proffered justifications for it.
The first article of impeachment in the first impeachment of President
Trump rested on just such a claim. The first article focused on President
Trump’s phone call with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky on
July 25, 2019, and the surrounding administration interaction with the
Ukrainians.69 The United States was providing military aid to Ukraine in
support of its ongoing conflict with a Russian incursion on its eastern
border. The Trump administration was holding up the delivery of some of
that aid. Hunter Biden, the son of Democratic presidential aspirant Joe
Biden, also had a history of financial interests in Ukraine, and the Trump
White House was particularly concerned with demonstrating, or at least
suggesting, that the Bidens had themselves behaved in a corrupt fashion
in dealing with Ukraine. These two separate issues were tied together by
President Trump in his phone call with Zelensky. Trump responded to
Zelensky’s expression of interest in acquiring Javelin anti-tank missiles
See, e.g., VA. CONST. of 1776 (“The Governor, when he is out of office, and
others, offending against the State, either by mal-administration, corruption, or other
means, by which the safety of the State may be endangered, shall be impeachable by
the House of Delegates”); N.Y. Const. of 1777 (“That the power of impeaching all
officers of the State, for mal and corrupt conduct in their respective offices, be vested
in the representatives of the people in assembly”); N.C. CONST. of 1776 (“the
Governor, and other officers, offending against the State, by violating any part of this
Constitution, mal-administration, or corruption, may be prosecuted, on the
impeachment of the General Assembly”).
69
S. Doc. No. 116–12, at 2 (2020).
68

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss3/13

16

Whittington: Impeachment in a System of Checks and Balances

2022] IMPEACHMENT IN A SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES

851

from the United States with the non-sequitur, “I would like you to do us a
favor though,” and transitioned to encouraging the Ukrainian government
to investigate the Bidens.70 Meanwhile, Trump’s private emissaries were
making it clear to Ukrainian officials that they would at least need to “issue
a public statement” that Trump’s domestic political rivals were under
criminal investigation if they expected the White House to release
American military aid to them and provide public support for the Zelensky
government.71
The possibility that the president was withholding American arms
from a foreign ally with no clear “policy rational” but with an evident
interest in advancing his own personal political interests would certainly
fit the bill of corruption.72 Accordingly, the first article of impeachment
characterized the president’s action as a “course of conduct for corrupt
purposes in pursuit of personal political benefit.”73 It is of less significance
for constitutional purposes whether such actions amounted to bribery or
extortion under criminal statutes than whether they represented corruption
of the office for the personal benefit of the officeholder.
The second article of impeachment, which too often seemed like an
afterthought for the House during the impeachment inquiry and Senate
trial, focused on a very different issue. It charged the President with
obstruction of Congress as a result of the White House’s refusal to
cooperate with congressional inquiries.74 It was, at heart, an effort to
defend Congress’s own institutional prerogatives as a coordinate branch
of government.
The U.S. Constitution does not vest an explicit power of oversight or
investigation in Congress. The grant to the House of Representatives of
the sole power to impeach and to the Senate the sole power to try all
impeachments is the one place where the Constitution would seem to put
Congress in that role. The Constitution vests “all legislative Powers herein
granted” to Congress, but investigative powers are not clearly legislative
in nature.75 Nonetheless, judges and politicians have long understood

Zachary B. Wolf & Curt Merrill, Trump’s Ukraine Phone Call, Annotated,
CNN (Sep. 25, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/09/politics/trumpukraine-transcript-annotated/ [https://perma.cc/RW9U-7EAJ].
71
Viola Gienger and Ryan Goodman, Timeline: Trump, Giuliani, Biden, and
Ukrainegate, JUST SEC. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/66271/timelinetrump-giuliani-bidens-and-ukrainegate/ [https://perma.cc/HTL7-6D9L].
72
Document: Read the Whistle-Blower Complaint, N. Y. TIMES (Sep. 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/26/us/politics/whistle-blowercomplaint.html [https://perma.cc/W49G-X6SN].
73
S. Doc. No. 116–12, at 1 (2020).
74
Id. at 4.
75
John M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 159−60 (1926).
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legislatures to have the authority to do some investigative work even
outside the impeachment context.76
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the English philosopher and
liberal reformer John Stuart Mill had come to doubt how well an elected
legislature could actually make informed policy decisions and govern,
casting doubt on the legislature’s most traditional role within the political
system. Even so, he thought the oversight function of the modern
legislature was its most essential function.
The proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control
the government: to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a
full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers
questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men
who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfil it in a manner
which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them
from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint their successors.
This is surely ample power, and security enough for the liberty of the
nation.77

Congress must also be able to engage in investigations to perform
particular non-legislative tasks that the Constitution has entrusted to it.
When the Senate is called upon to ratify a treaty or confirm a nominee for
an office, it must gather information to help it determine whether it should
accede to the president’s wishes.78 When Congress considers whether it
should authorize the use of military force against another nation, it must
take steps to determine whether such military action is warranted or
advisable.79 When the House contemplates whether it should exercise its
sole power of impeachment, it must inquire into the conduct of
government officers to determine whether anything is amiss, and whether
impeachment and removal are the proper remedy.80
Presidential administrations are often the targets of such
investigations, and presidents are not always eager to cooperate with them.
Claims of executive privilege have been a common basis on which
presidents have asserted that limits exist as to how far they should
cooperate with congressional investigations.
Like congressional
oversight, executive privilege is not mentioned in the Constitution, but has

76
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instead been inferred from it as a necessary implication of the president’s
constitutional responsibilities and the effective functioning of the separate
branches of government.
When the House of Representatives balked at passing a statute
needed to help implement the controversial Jay Treaty of 1795, it asked
the President to supply all the communications relating to the negotiation
of the treaty to inform its deliberations about whether to adopt the
legislation the President wanted.81 George Washington responded that it
was his “constant endeavor to harmonize with the other branches” of the
government, but that some of the requested documents were sensitive.82
The House had no proper right to such documents, and the president had
no duty to provide them. James Madison, then serving in the House,
responded to Washington’s message by insisting that the President could
only appropriately assess the executive branch’s own interest in those
papers, but he “ought not to refuse them as irrelative to the objects of the
House,” which was something that the House alone could properly judge.83
Washington admitted that that the House had the constitutional authority
to inspect the executive’s papers if it were part of an impeachment
investigation, but such a purpose had not been “expressed.”84 Madison
countered that the House had no obligation to state that it wanted access
to documents for purposes of an impeachment inquiry, and in many cases
it might even be “evidently improper to state that to be the object of
information.”85 In the end, they compromised, and the House passed the
desired bill.
The first president and the Fourth Congress were grappling with some
basic constitutional and political problems that continue to bedevil the
45th president and the 116th Congress. Washington was confronting the
emergence of the first divided government, in which the House majority
was in organized opposition to his own administration, a situation that
Washington came to regard as threatening to the very foundations of the
republic. An opposing party is particularly motivated to make unpleasant
demands on the presidential administration and to scrutinize its every
action with great skepticism, and presidents are often inclined to think that
an opposing party is behaving unscrupulously and unfairly. At the same
time, presidents can often rely on their partisan friends to go easy on them
and not be too aggressive in exposing the administration’s problems.86
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Washington and Madison were also confronting a fundamental
question in the American constitutional system about who should be able
to judge the constitutional rights and responsibilities of the various
branches of the government and what tools Congress had available to
compel a reluctant executive to cooperate with its inquiries. They left
those questions unresolved, and they remain unresolved. Both the House
and the President insisted on their own authority to judge their own
constitutional responsibilities, but both denied the authority of others to
judge those responsibilities.87 The President could reasonably assert
executive privilege, but he could not reasonably tell the House what
information it did or did not need to perform its own duties. The President
had control over the information that the House wanted to examine, but
the President needed the House’s cooperation to advance the policies he
desired. And as Washington seemed to recognize, the House had the
ultimate power to impeach the president and could demand whatever
information it might deem relevant to that inquiry or let the president face
the consequences if he refused to satisfy their concerns.
The system has worked through give and take. Both branches of
government have recognized that they should not push things too far and
that there are deals to be made to overcome impasses. Madison in the
House understood that some information did in fact need to be kept
confidential if the president were to be able to perform his constitutional
functions on behalf of the nation. Washington in the White House
understood that interbranch cooperation and concessions would be
necessary to keep the government functioning, and that as a practical
matter there were things he needed from the House, thus requiring him to
find ways to satisfy its members.
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone’s letter to the House regarding
the House impeachment inquiry could not have been more distant from
Washington’s letter to the House in tone, substance, or attitude.88 Trump’s
White House Counsel responded to the House’s “numerous, legally
unsupported decisions made as part of what you have labeled – contrary
to the Constitution of the United States and all past bipartisan precedent –
as an ‘impeachment inquiry.’”89 In the eyes of the White House, the
inquiry “violate[d] fundamental fairness and constitutionally mandated
due process.”90 The House was simply seeking “to overturn the results of
article continues, “In this case, Washington benefited from a Federalist Senate that
was willing to ratify the Jay Treaty despite the objections of the Jeffersonian
opposition, which held more seats in the House.”).
87
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the 2016 election and deprive the American people of the President they
have freely chosen.”91 The “baseless, unconstitutional effort to overturn
the democratic process” had “left the President with no choice” but to
refuse to “participate in your partisan and unconstitutional inquiry.”92
President Trump “cannot allow your constitutionally illegitimate
proceedings to distract him and those in the Executive Branch from their
work on behalf of the American people.”93 The President “has a country
to lead” and the executive branch would simply ignore the so-called
“impeachment inquiry” in the House.94
Cipollone’s letter reflects the intense partisan divide in contemporary
politics and the distrust that had grown between the Democrats in
Congress and the Trump White House. It also reflects a sense that the
House and the administration had reached the endgame. James Madison’s
House had some leverage over the Washington administration because it
had something that the administration wanted, and there was some realistic
possibility of reaching an accommodation that could satisfy both sides.
Nancy Pelosi’s House seemed to have lost much of its leverage over the
Trump administration. The President seemed to assume that he would
inevitably be impeached and that there was no legislative policy agenda to
be advanced, and so he had nothing more to lose by refusing to cooperate
further with the House. He was positioning himself for the Senate trial
and the 2020 electoral campaign.
More than once after the Democrats captured the House of
Representatives in the midterm elections of 2018, President Donald Trump
had taken to Twitter to express his irritation at “presidential harassment!”95
Undoubtedly, he was not the first occupant of the Oval Office to feel that
way, but his response had been different. The Trump administration had
tended to adopt a posture of maximal presidential obstruction of
congressional investigations into the conduct of the executive branch and
the individuals surrounding it. That defiance culminated in Cipollone’s
letter to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi declaring that the
administration would not cooperate in any way with an impeachment
inquiry that it regarded as “illegitimate” and “constitutionally invalid.”96
Cipollone, on behalf of the President, had thrown down the gauntlet.
The White House refused to offer documents or testimony to the House—
91
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even those that might have put the President's or the administration's
conduct in a better light. The House could either choose to impeach the
President based on what it already knew or could discover without the
president's cooperation, or it could move on and drop the impeachment
effort. The President had dared the House to impeach him, and he had
then chosen to mount his defense against possible removal in the Senate
and in the court of public opinion. Members of Congress of both parties
should understand the institutional stakes of such a challenge. If President
Trump could simply issue a blanket refusal to cooperate with any
congressional oversight of executive branch activities and still not be
impeached, then Congress should expect that future presidents will try to
build on that example.
Congress has some capacity to pressure an administration to comply
with its subpoenas by turning to the courts or even using its inherent
contempt power to detain an uncooperative witness, but its more
substantial weapons have always been political.97 Congress can refuse to
adopt policies that an administration wants. The Senate can refuse to
confirm nominees that the president wants to see seated. Congress can
refuse to provide funding for White House priorities. At the extreme, the
House can vote to impeach, and the Senate can vote to remove officers
who stonewall congressional investigations.
Congress is often reluctant to use those constitutional weapons, in
part because there will be collateral damage. Congress also wants laws
passed, the government funded, and vacant offices filled. The stakes of a
particular dispute between the branches are not always high enough to
make those costs worth bearing. The Trump administration could credibly
threaten complete noncooperation with the House because it did not think
there was much to be gained by cooperation, and in those circumstances,
Congress will have lost an important part of its leverage over the White
House. The challenge for the House is in demonstrating to a presidential
administration that there are still things to lose, and perhaps still things to
be won. And ultimately, as Madison himself noted, if certain issues cannot
“be adjusted by the departments themselves,” then “there is no resource
left but the will of the community.”98 The two sides can plead their case
to the electorate and pray the voters can resolve the disagreement.

IV. DOES THIS INSTANCE OF MISCONDUCT JUSTIFY IMPEACHMENT?
Even after the House has come to an understanding of the scope of
impeachable offenses and satisfied itself that an officer has committed
97
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deeds that fall within that scope, it must still decide whether an
impeachment is warranted. Ultimately, the Senate too must decide not
only whether the House has demonstrated that an officer has committed
impeachable offenses but also whether the offenses rise to the level that
would justify conviction and removal of the officer. Those decisions to
impeach and to convict are necessarily political judgments about what
risks the country faces and how they are best navigated. They require an
understanding of what the impeachment power is for.
To appreciate the importance of this question, we must appreciate
that impeachments are matters of constitutional politics, not legalities.
The impeachment power is entrusted to Congress as a potential remedy to
a severe political problem, but the impeachment power is the heaviest
artillery in the congressional arsenal and should not be used if other, less
dramatic remedies are available and can get the job done. Moreover, the
audience for these arguments is ultimately political. The president and his
defenders must persuade the members of the House and Senate, and
beyond them the American people, that no unforgivable sins have been
committed. That is not primarily a lawyerly task but a political one. If the
president loses the battle for public opinion, then the legislative conclusion
that the offenses are in fact impeachable will likely follow.
The language of the Constitution is discretionary, not mandatory.
The House “shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.”99 The language
is framed this way for a reason. The House is empowered to impeach an
officer of the government, including the president, if it discovers high
crimes and misdemeanors, but it might choose to react differently. The
point is not that the House should feel free to ignore abuses of office but
simply that impeachment is not the only way to address them.
The House’s own guidebook on rules and precedents emphasizes that
the impeachment power is designed to be “a constitutional remedy to
address serious offenses against the system of government.”100 One
important question then, is whether the country suffers grave ills.101 If
those are identified, that leaves the issue of whether impeachment is a
useful remedy. The House might conclude that a president has committed
impeachable offenses, but it may not believe that impeachment and
removal are in the nation’s best interest. An impeachment inquiry will
help reveal what, if any, misconduct has occurred and how serious that
might be, but it will require further political judgment to decide how to
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respond. Through his own actions, Trump had strengthened the case for
impeachment as both justified and in the nation’s best interest.
Most obviously, it was not clear at the time that the House was
engaging in its investigation that Trump would be convicted in the Senate.
Impeachment requires only a simple majority in the House, so the decision
to impeach is a conversation the Democrats could have among themselves.
Conviction on articles of impeachment and removal from office require
the support of two-thirds of the Senate, which meant persuading a
significant number of Republicans. If removing the president from office
is the best remedy to the country’s perceived troubles, then the House
might be obliged to press forward—if there is a realistic chance of
conviction. But if Republican voters remained firmly in Trump’s corner
and Republican senators remained unwilling to buck their constituents,
then rushing ahead with an impeachment could be counterproductive. The
House has no duty to impeach just for the sake of making hopeless,
symbolic gestures.
If the point of impeachment is removal, no shortcut can avoid the
necessity of chipping away at the president’s public and political support
until the prospect of a Senate conviction is something more than a Hail
Mary pass. When the Ukraine revelations first came to light, there were
some indications that the scandal could shake some Republicans loose
from Trump.102 So the House’s real constitutional duty in such
circumstances was to try to widen that political opening. That meant not
only proceeding with the investigation in a way that might move public
opinion and pressure Republican politicians, but also confining any
eventual articles of impeachment to charges that stood a chance of winning
conviction. Larding on additional charges that might satisfy the
Democratic base but repel wavering Republicans would have been a
mistake if the point was to win a conviction. In that sense the
impeachment process is not so different than the legislative process;
getting things done requires compromise and satisfying the pivotal players
who are needed to get over the majoritarian or super-majoritarian hurdles
of the process.103
In the case of a president, an alternative remedy to presidential
misbehavior is always an electoral one. If the president poses an imminent
threat to the country because of his ongoing abuse of power, then waiting
for the election cycle to play out would be reckless. If, however, the
president’s apparent misconduct is in the past, containable or of lesser
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consequence, then exposing problems for voters to see and leaving the
final judgment to the American people becomes a viable option, and in
some circumstances the most responsible option.104
Depending on the nature of the presidential conduct, lesser political
remedies might be available to curb presidential behavior and protect the
public interest. Richard Nixon was eventually abandoned by his own party
and pushed out of office with the credible threat of impeachment and
removal, but lawmakers responded not just by pursuing an impeachment
inquiry but also by addressing the underlying concerns about abuse of
executive power. Congress adopted internal reforms so it could respond
more effectively to a hostile president and reconsidered the statutory
grants of authority that future presidents might misuse.105 Presidential
administrations can likewise take credible steps toward demonstrating that
ills afflicting the body politic can be remedied without the necessity of
removing the president from office.106 If Senate Republicans had been
willing to hold the threat of conviction over President Trump’s head, they
might have demanded, and received, a significant shake-up in White
House staff and operating procedures. Senators could have demanded that
there be “adults in the room” with Trump and people holding positions of
responsibility willing to push back against presidential whims.107 Whether
such concessions should have been regarded as adequate given the wellknown impulsiveness and stubbornness of President Trump is another
question, but congressional Republicans seemed content to simply hope
that the President might someday begin to act more presidential.
Even if conviction and removal are effectively off the table, there
might still be reasons to impeach.108 Impeachment can serve other
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purposes.109 It can serve as a tool for shoring up, or changing, the accepted
norms of political behavior.110 Impeachment can be a rebuke to the
officeholder and a warning to his successors. If violating norms appears
to be a path to political success, the theory goes, established norms will
eventually crumble. Impeachment is a tool to impose political costs on
norm violators and discourage others from emulating them. If President
Trump’s actions were properly within the scope of the impeachment
power, then the House could reasonably decide using the impeachment
process to condemn the President’s actions could be productive even if the
President could not be removed.

V. CONCLUSION
The first Trump impeachment starkly exposed the difficulties that the
modern Congress has in wielding the impeachment power as an effective
check on the presidency. Presidents have significant advantages in
impeachment battles in the current political environment. Deep partisan
polarization makes it relatively easy for a president to retain the support of
his co-partisans when he is under attack from members of the opposite
party. The presidency comes with substantial resources to shape public
opinion, influence potential allies, and rally political support. Political
leaders have learned that if they are willing to weather a political scandal,
they can often survive it. President Trump had additional unique
advantages in that Congress had little leverage over him since he did not
want much from it and did not expect much of it. Trump’s legislative
agenda was minimal and largely dead-on-arrival, and the President could
reasonably make the calculation that Democrats were determined to do all
they could to hamper his administration once they won control of the
House in the midterms. Under the circumstances, retreating into the shell
of the White House was a viable strategy. Future presidents might feel
that there are more downsides than Trump did to having to battle through
an impeachment process and as a consequence might be willing to do more
to avoid going down that path. But a stubborn president can be difficult
to dislodge.
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Congress encountered problems of its own making as well. A
necessary, though hardly sufficient, condition for Congress to do better
next time is to better understand its own impeachment process. That
begins by understanding that impeachment is necessarily a political
process. It requires political effort to build support for using the
impeachment power, and it requires political judgment to determine
whether the impeachment power should be used. To borrow a phrase,
impeachment is a continuation of politics by other means, and the means
can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. If Congress is to
contemplate pursuing an impeachment, it should have a clear view of what
it is trying to accomplish and why impeachment is the best path to getting
there.
From a constitutional perspective, the first Trump impeachment
raised familiar questions about how to understand the nature of the
congressional power to impeach and remove a sitting president.
Legislators who find themselves called upon to consider making use of the
impeachment power have an obligation to think through some basic
questions. What is an impeachable offense? Is this kind of behavior
impeachable? Does this instance of misconduct justify impeachment?
Legislators were not as clear as they could have been in asking and
answering such questions during the Trump presidency, but the
presidential actions that led to the first impeachment made the third
question particularly salient. Despite the efforts of the President’s
defenders to narrow the scope of impeachable offenses, it seems clear that
such efforts were contrary to the purpose and history of the impeachment
power. Moreover, the behavior at issue in this case could be comfortably
situated within that traditional understanding of the scope of the
impeachment power. The hard question should have been the third,
whether the President’s particular actions justified his impeachment and
removal in an election year and in such a highly polarized environment.
The President’s charges that the impeachment effort was illegitimate was
bound to resonate with a sizable swatch of the country, and it soon became
apparent that this scandal would not erode the President’s core base of
political support. Given that reality, conviction and removal was a
longshot at best. Perhaps the impeachment process could nonetheless have
been used to extract concessions from the White House or to shore up
political norms about proper presidential behavior. It is not obvious that
it achieved either, but that does not mean that future impeachments could
not accomplish more.
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